Unity and multiplicity: SMM/DTT and Integrated information theory

01The question behind the comparison

The claim that reality has one source does not abolish the problem of plurality; it relocates it. SMM proposes that spatially distinct things arise through the activity of a nonspatial Single Monad. The philosophical strength of this move is that common origin can explain why different objects belong to one connected world. Its central task is individuation: why do the resulting differences amount to several objects, several perspectives or several experiences, rather than merely several descriptions of one undifferentiated entity?

Several forms of unity must be distinguished. Numerical unity says there is one fundamental being. Unity of kind says that many things share one basic nature. Structural unity says that relations form one coherent system. Experiential unity says that a group of contents belongs to one subject. These claims do not entail one another. A connected graph can represent many independent observers; one physical system can contain several informationally separated subsystems. DTT’s single source therefore becomes an explanation of multiplicity only when the construction specifies which relations individuate its outputs.

The six nested inner levels can be understood as a proposed path from undivided source activity toward relational articulation and completed observation. Nesting is useful because a later distinction can depend on earlier retained differences without adding a new ultimate substance. Yet merely counting layers does not prove that their products are spatial objects or conscious subjects. Each kind of plurality needs its own criterion: separable interventions for physical subsystems, stable trajectories for objects, and a reason that experiences belong to one perspective rather than another. This is where comparisons with other monisms become most informative.

02The single-source and nested-time proposal

SMM begins with one nonspatial generative source. DTT distinguishes its inner production from the outer order in which completed results become accessible. The six inner levels are nested functional dependencies within that production; the seventh denotes outer completion. They are not six independent clocks, six spatial directions, or six simultaneously occupied temporal axes. This distinction makes the framework more specific than a general claim that everything changes: it asks how a world of persistent relations can be generated before its spatial representation is taken for granted. ^[2]

03The comparator’s explanatory structure

IIT proposes that experience corresponds to an intrinsic, irreducible cause-effect structure. Its formal analysis concerns a specified system, its state and counterfactual transitions under a chosen modelling scale. It should not be reduced to the claim that more stored bits mean more consciousness. Integration, information and the identification of a subject are separate requirements within the programme.

Consider two independent memory banks storing the same file. Their data agree, but agreement is not the same as an integrated causal organization. Connecting them through reciprocal operations changes the causal model even if the visible file remains the same. This distinction is useful for SMM/DTT: a common source or a completed archive need not constitute one conscious subject. A bridge to IIT would require a transition structure and an account of system boundaries, then a reason to accept IIT’s proposed identity with experience. The mathematical calculation and that identity claim should remain distinguishable. ^[1]

04The precise agreement and difference

IIT’s unity concerns the irreducibility of a specified cause-effect structure, whereas SMM’s unity concerns the source of all generated multiplicity. These are different scales and different criteria. A single producer can generate several causally separated systems, and a system with many components can be integrated. Therefore the number of ultimate sources does not determine the number of subjects in IIT.

DTT can make a useful contribution by modelling how boundaries and reciprocal dependencies emerge. If its completed records form a transition network, that network can be analyzed for integration under a specified scale and intervention scheme. The analysis might yield one integrated subsystem, several, or none that meets the theory’s requirements. The outcome would constrain a proposed connection to consciousness. The distinctive SMM question is why the network is generated in that form. This comparison replaces the tempting equation one source equals one mind with a constructive problem: derive the differentiated causal organization first, then explain what would make one of its organizations an experiential unity rather than merely an archive. ^[1]

05Worked example: what follows and what does not

Imagine one computer producing two independently accessible virtual notebooks. One author can edit the first without changing the second; the notebooks retain different histories and expose different information. A common physical source is compatible with distinct functional identities. It does not follow that either notebook has experience, or that the computer is a universal subject. The example separates three inferences often compressed into unity: common production, independently addressable outputs, and phenomenal subjecthood. SMM/DTT can employ the first as its foundation while building a detailed account of the second. A transition to the third would require an additional theory of experience, rather than a change in terminology.

06What this comparison contributes

A fruitful monist construction should preserve the differences it promises to explain. If every local distinction is declared unreal, there is little left to connect with a world of measurements and persons. If all distinctions are simply assumed, the unity has done little explanatory work. DTT’s best opportunity lies between these extremes: source unity constrains possible patterns, while retained relations make the patterns objectively distinguishable. This supplies a concrete philosophical standard for assessing each comparison without reducing every tradition to a version of the same doctrine.

THE SAME QUESTION, DIFFERENT STARTING POINTS

The comparison at a glance

Continue on SMONAD

• One and many: what a common source must explain →

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