Skip to content

REALITY & TIME · EXISTENCE AND THE WORLD WE EXPERIENCE

The growing block view of time

Compare an expanding history with presentism and eternalism, and separate an objective newest boundary from a component’s retained records.

The growing block view grants reality to the past and present while denying that the future already exists. Its distinctive task is to explain an expanding history whose newest boundary is the present.

What grows?

A familiar formulation adds new events without removing the earlier ones. This differs from presentism, where only present things exist, and from eternalism, where future events also belong to reality. The differences concern existence, not the amount of information stored in a notebook.

The comparison below gives deliberately minimal formulations. Individual philosophers add qualifications about objects, events, tense and persistence; the table is a starting point for asking questions, not a substitute for those arguments.

Three starting commitments about temporal existence
ViewPast eventsPresent eventsFuture events
PresentismNo longer existExistDo not yet exist
Growing blockExistExist at the newest boundaryDo not yet exist
EternalismExistExistExist

A finite illustration

Let an illustrative history at stage n contain events e0 through en. Write Hn = {e0,…,en}. The next stage is Hn+1 = Hn ∪ {en+1}. Earlier members remain; a new member is added. The set size rises from n+1 to n+2.

This notation makes one structural commitment explicit. It does not explain why a new event occurs, what determines its character or whether physical time consists of discrete steps. The finite construction is an original teaching illustration, not an asserted model of the universe.

It also leaves open what stage means. If n simply orders additions, it need not name a second physical clock outside the history. If a theory assigns a physical duration to growth, that duration requires a stated interpretation and a way of comparing it with clocks inside the world.

Recognizing the newest boundary

Ned Markosian's published discussion of the growing block examines an epistemic challenge: how could someone establish that their experience is located at the newest boundary rather than in the retained past? He develops the issue through different accounts of persistence and experience. The challenge is not settled by the bare assertion that past events remain real.

To isolate the question, imagine that every illustrated event contains a dated statement, this is happening now. The statements can correctly indicate their own local dates. An additional claim that one statement identifies the outermost boundary of all existence needs an additional account.

Do not turn this into an unsupported probability argument. Counting many past statements and one boundary statement does not, without a justified sampling measure, establish the probability that a particular observer is at the boundary. Nor does the view automatically entail that past people repeatedly experience their past moments. Those are substantive interpretive questions.

Records are not the past itself

An archive can grow by retaining entries, but its growth is not evidence that temporal reality has the same structure. Conversely, deleting an entry does not imply that the event it described ceased to have happened.

Consider a recorder that retains only the last three outcomes. After outcomes a,b,c,d, it displays b,c,d. Its accessible memory is not cumulative, even though the mathematical history used to describe its operation contains all four outcomes. A model must distinguish the world's proposed history from the information retained by one component.

This is especially useful when comparing the growing block with completion. The book defines operational records through the future tests they support. A sufficient record may compress a history, whereas the growing block is a claim about the existence of events.

From growth to a physical proposal

SMM/DTT can be compared with growing-block ideas through generation, retention and the availability of observation. The comparison must identify whether completion adds an event, replaces a description or passes to an equivalence class of histories. Those operations have different meanings.

A physical proposal must also address relativistic ordering. For spacelike-separated events, choosing an order of updates need not establish an observable global present. The book's schedule-independence condition offers a concrete question: can any admitted future observation distinguish the proposed order?

Sources and further reading

  1. Ned Markosian, The Growing Block, the Epistemic Objection and Zombie Parrots, Disputatio 13 (2021), 399–410.
  2. Mohamed Haj Yousef, When are two histories the same? and When inner order becomes unobservable.

Continue reading

Essay · 4 min read

Eternalism and the complete history

Distinguish a complete history from determinism and universal knowledge, using simple sequences to clarify the claim of eternalism.

Worked example · 5 min read

Inner generation and outer completion

A finite completion protocol introduces two temporal roles and connects them to the Duality of Time book and published mathematical work.

Follow a connected reading path →

SMONAD

Share this page

Share this page with its own title, summary and preview image.

More platforms